

**President Ramo:** Well, it obviously takes a justice of the United States Supreme Court to get everybody here on time. I am going to have to do this more often.

Ladies and gentlemen, it is my greatest honor and deep pleasure to invite you to welcome to our podium Justice John Paul Stevens of the United States Supreme Court. *(Applause)*

Justice Stevens is, in my mind, the very perfect justice of the United States Supreme Court, but let me tell you why: because his life experience is so broad, his compassion so deep, and his intellect so very far-reaching.

Let me tell you how I first met Justice Stevens, because I think it offers an insight into the kind of human being he is. Many years ago in Albuquerque, New Mexico, Justice Stevens and his wife snuck in to play in a bridge tournament, and one of my partners at the time had been his clerk and invited him and his wife, and happily Barry and me, to dinner.

I couldn't even imagine meeting a justice of the Supreme Court, let alone having dinner, and we had an incredibly wonderful dinner at which Justice Stevens told us all about what it was like to be a justice of the United States Supreme Court, go to a bridge tournament, and have no one care anything about it except what you had just played, and they felt quite free to tell him what they thought of what he had just played. *(Laughter)*

But at the end of the evening there was a kind of uncomfortable silence, and Justice Stevens finally said to his former law clerk, Greg Huffaker, "Greg, don't you want to invite me to come to your firm to meet the lawyers in your firm and your law clerks?" Of course we couldn't imagine having been bold enough to ask him to do that. So in Albuquerque, New Mexico, in the summer, in a law firm of 21 people, we introduced Justice Stevens and our law clerks thought we were the smartest human beings on the planet. *(Laughter)*

But what happened was even more remarkable. When Justice Stevens sat down in our very small conference room in the old bank building, which had been most famous to that moment because a scene from the movie *The Muppets Take Manhattan* had taken place in that very conference room, he spoke for a few minutes and then he said, "But I have questions to ask you." And he spent the rest of almost two hours asking people what it was like to practice law in Albuquerque, New Mexico, what it was like then to be a law student, what it was like to come to a firm, what things people were worried about, what was important to them, what they saw as important and possible in the life of the law.

That kind of desire to continue to understand what is going on in the lives of all kinds of people is, when combined with his great scholarship, combined with his great intellect, and combined with his great compassion, what has made him, to me, the very perfect person to sit on the highest court of the land.

Justice Stevens, it is an honor to have you here and we thank you very much.  
(Applause)

**Justice John Paul Stevens:** Thank you. Thank you, Roberta.

Before I read you my prepared remarks, I have to acknowledge what a nice introduction that was because I remember that occasion very well, too, and that is part of the reason that I was very happy to be privileged to talk at the American Bar Association convention in Florida when Roberta was the first woman president of this association. And it reminded me, it is not particularly relevant, but it did remind me of the fact that I sort of specialized in talking at bar-association occasions honoring first woman presidents, because I had previously talked to the Chicago Bar Association back in the 1970s when Esther Rothstein became president of the association, and she was then the first woman president of a major bar association. Of course Roberta followed up, and, as Greg Huffaker told me at the time, she was going to have a sensational career, which, of course, was an obviously correct prediction.

But this afternoon I thought I would make a brief comment on Bush against Gore.<sup>1</sup> Because there has been so much discussion of the remedy issue in that case—in which a majority of the United States Supreme Court issued a stay that halted the recount of Florida votes in the Presidential election of 2000<sup>2</sup>—the significance of the Court’s *per curiam* opinion’s reliance on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has been generally overlooked.

As you may recall, in the 2000 election Florida used voting machines to count ballots on which voters had used a stylus to punch a hole in the small circle opposite the preferred candidate’s name. Voters who successfully followed the written instructions punched a complete hole in the ballots and their votes were accurately counted by the machines. The voters whose votes were not counted by the machines fell into two categories, so-called “overvotes” and “undervotes.” The overvote category included ballots on which the voter had tried to vote for two or more candidates for the same office. The undervote category included ballots on which the voter had designated just one candidate, but had failed to make a complete hole in the ballot. There were two subcategories of undervotes—“hanging chads” and “dimpled chads.” (*Laughter*) In the “hanging chad” subcategory, the punched-out piece of the ballot remained only partially attached whereas a ballot with a dimpled chad contained an indentation but no hole.

The Florida Supreme Court ordered a manual recount to be conducted according to the “intent of the voter” standard established by Florida law.<sup>3</sup> That court did not require a recount of overvotes, presumably because a reexamination of those ballots would seldom reveal the identity of the voter’s preferred candidate. The question with respect to undervotes, however, was not whom the voter intended to support, but whether the voter intended to vote for any Presidential candidate at all. In the typical case, either a

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<sup>1</sup> 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (*per curiam*).

<sup>2</sup> *Bush*, 531 U.S. at 110-111.

<sup>3</sup> *Gore v. Harris*, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1247, 1254 (Fla. 2000) (*per curiam*).

hanging chad or a dimpled chad opposite the name of one candidate would both identify the voter's preferred candidate and indicate his or her intent to cast a vote.

During the recount, election officials differed on the question whether to count both dimpled chads and hanging chads, or just the latter—in other words, those for which light could be seen through the edge of the chad. In Palm Beach County, for example, the officials began to follow a 1990 guideline that drew a distinction between hanging and dimpled chads, but they ultimately ended up counting both subcategories of undervotes.<sup>4</sup> In its *per curiam* opinion, the United States Supreme Court described that change in a way that gave the reader the impression that the officials had engaged in a standardless endeavor. The opinion states:

Palm Beach County, for example, began the process with a 1990 guideline which precluded counting completely attached chads, switched to a rule that considered a vote to be legal if any light could be seen through a chad, changed back to the 1990 rule, and then abandoned any pretense of a *per se* rule, only to have a court order that the county consider dimpled chads legal.<sup>5</sup>

The paragraph is misleading in two respects. First, what it describes as switching to a new rule was in fact only a clarification of the original rule that considered only hanging chads as valid votes. The “new” rule clarified that a hanging chad was one through which any light could be seen, since that evidenced that the chad was not completely attached. Second, what the paragraph describes as changing back to the 1990 rule was just a continuation of the practice of not counting dimpled chads. Of most significance, however, is the fact that the county ended up treating dimpled chads as valid votes before the United States Supreme Court ruled.

While the Court's *per curiam* opinion is misleading in other respects—for example, its implicit suggestion that the failure to order a recount of the estimated 110,000 overvotes was error despite the lack of evidence or argument suggesting how one could tell which candidate the voter intended to support—the principal point I want to make this morning concerns the absence of any coherent rationale supporting the opinion's reliance on the Equal Protection Clause.

The Equal Protection Clause requires states to govern impartially, and has particular force in protecting the right to vote.<sup>6</sup> There must be a neutral justification for rules or practices that discriminate for or against individuals on the basis of identifiable characteristics—including groups of individuals that are defined by race, by political affiliation, or by their residence in a particular location. The One-Person-One-Vote Rule, for example, prohibits States from giving greater weight to votes in rural areas than to

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<sup>4</sup> See Don Van Natta Jr., *The Dimples; Trying to Interpret a Ballot's Goosebumps*, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2000.

<sup>5</sup> *Bush*, 531 U.S. at 106-107.

<sup>6</sup> See *Katzenbach v. Morgan*, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); *Reynolds v. Sims*, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); *Yick Wo v. Hopkins*, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).

votes in densely populated cities.<sup>7</sup> If residents of Palm Beach County, or perhaps members of the Democratic Party, were more likely than other voters to produce dimpled chads rather than hanging chads, there might be reason to hold that counting the two subcategories of undervotes differently would violate the Equal Protection Clause. But there was no claim by anyone in the case that variations in the methods of counting undervotes had any systemic significance. The mere possibility that accidental and random errors might occur during the voting and recount processes would not establish any intentional discrimination against a pre-identified group of voters, and would not even establish any unintended disparate impact on either candidate. And surely there would be nothing even arguably discriminatory in applying a rule that counted dimpled chads just like hanging chads.

Perhaps the Florida Supreme Court's opinion ordering a statewide recount of undervotes was flawed because it failed to state expressly that dimpled chads as well as hanging chads should be counted as valid votes. If that omission was a flaw, it could have been remedied on remand by quoting the following two sentences from an Illinois case, *Pullen* against *Mulligan*, decided a decade earlier:

The objection . . . that to be counted the chad should be fully punched out or that at least there should be a hanging chad on the back side of the ballot would set too rigid a standard for determining whether the voter intended to vote for the particular candidate. Many voters could be disenfranchised without their fault if, for example, ballots with only perforations on the chad could not be regarded as indicating the voter's intent to vote.<sup>8</sup>

I have never thought the Florida Supreme Court's opinion was flawed, however, because it seems obvious to me—as it did to the unanimous Illinois Supreme Court in *Pullen*—that the “intent of the voter” standard, on which the Florida Supreme Court relied, was sufficiently clear to encompass dimpled chads.

My principal purpose in calling your attention to the Court's reliance on the Equal Protection Clause in *Bush* against *Gore* is to emphasize how that provision of our Constitution, properly construed, would invalidate an invidious form of political behavior that remains popular today. If a mere defect in the standards governing voting recount practices can violate the States' duty to govern impartially, surely it must follow that the intentional practice of drawing bizarre boundaries of electoral districts in order to enhance the political power of the dominant party is unconstitutional. In recent cases, however, members of the majority of the Supreme Court have written opinions concluding that the absence of judicially manageable standards precludes judicial review of even the most obvious political gerrymanders.<sup>9</sup> Several separate opinions of members of the Court, including one written by Justice Lewis Powell in *Davis* against *Bandemer* in

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<sup>7</sup> See *Reynolds*, 377 U.S. at 560-561.

<sup>8</sup> *Pullen v. Mulligan*, 561 N.E.2d 585, 614 (Ill. 1990).

<sup>9</sup> See, e.g., *Vieth v. Jubelirer*, 541 U.S. 267 (2004); *LULAC v. Perry*, 548 U.S. 399, 420-423 (2006); see also *Bartlett v. Strickland*, 556 U.S. 1, 22 (2009).

1986, as well as several of my own, have identified such standards for reviewing partisan gerrymanders;<sup>10</sup> and even a majority of the Court has applied manageable standards in cases involving racial gerrymandering.<sup>11</sup>

The unwillingness of the Supreme Court majority to recognize those standards has left a category of intentional discrimination against voters unchecked, so long as the discrimination is predicated on the basis of political party and not race. For example, just last year a three-judge district court rejected a challenge to Maryland's redistricting plan because the plaintiffs "ha[d] not shown that the State moved African-American voters from one district to another because they were African-American and not simply because they were Democrats."<sup>12</sup> Even though the plaintiffs' claim that Democratic politicians had drawn district lines to reduce the number of Republican-held congressional seats was, in the words of the court, "the easiest [claim] to accept factually," the court declared it the "weakest claim legally" because the Supreme Court has declared partisan gerrymandering nonjusticiable.<sup>13</sup> I will refrain from repeating the arguments that I have made in my opinions on this topic, but it seems appropriate to remind the members of this distinguished audience that both legislatures and courts have adequate power, and should recognize their responsibility, to curtail this insidious practice. The tools for doing so as a judicial matter have already been developed in the Supreme Court's racial gerrymandering jurisprudence, and in a number of separate opinions by members of the Court discussing political gerrymandering.

Thank you for your attention and for your continuing efforts to improve the law.  
(*Applause*)

**President Ramo:** Justice Stevens, I think it is tomorrow that we go to our Election Law project, so we will do so with some serious words in our minds.

Justice Stevens very kindly said that he might answer a question or two. I told him that there might be some reluctance of people to raise their hands, having these days now listened to oral arguments on at least the radio, but if there are people who would like to ask questions, please stand at one of the microphones and identify yourself. Yes, sir.

**Mr. Paul W. Mollica (III.):** Good afternoon, Justice. Did you see this morning that the Supreme Court summarily affirmed the decision in the League of Women Voters of Illinois v. Quinn case [132 S. Ct. 2430 (2012) (mem.)]? That was another partisan gerrymandering case.

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<sup>10</sup> See, e.g., *Davis v. Bandemer*, 478 U.S. 109, 161-185 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); *Vieth*, 541 U.S. at 317-341 (Stevens, J., dissenting); *id.* at 342-355 (Souter, J., dissenting); *id.* at 355-368 (Breyer, J., dissenting); *Karcher v. Daggett*, 462 U.S. 725, 744-765 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring); *LULAC*, 548 U.S. at 447-483 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

<sup>11</sup> See, e.g., *Shaw v. Reno*, 509 U.S. 630, 646-647 (1993); *Miller v. Johnson*, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); see also *Gomillion v. Lightfoot*, 364 U.S. 339, 349 (1960) (Whittaker, J., concurring).

<sup>12</sup> *Fletcher v. Lamone*, 831 F. Supp. 2d 887, 901 (D. Md. 2011).

<sup>13</sup> *Id.* at 903-904.

**President Ramo:** Is there a follow-up question, Paul, or you just wanted a comment?

**Mr. Mollica:** I wonder if he had—

**Justice Stevens:** All I can say is it is news to me. I have not seen the opinion yet.

**Mr. Mollica:** More bad news.

**President Ramo:** Yes, sir.

**Professor Harvey L. Zuckman (D.C.):** Justice Stevens, since your analysis of the Supreme Court's *per curiam* opinion in *Bush v. Gore* indicates how seriously flawed that opinion was, do you think that politics played a part in the majority's decision? (*Laughter*)

**Justice Stevens:** I don't know. (*Laughter*) (*Applause*)

**President Ramo:** If there are quick questions at the three microphones, 3, 5, and whatever microphone that is, 4. Yes, sir.

**Professor John B. Oakley (Cal.):** For nearly 40 years, since the 1974 decision in *Edelman v. Jordan* [415 U.S. 651 (1974)], the Supreme Court by a five-four majority, no matter who seems to come and who seems to go, has great difficulty getting the law of state sovereign immunity right, and you famously said in your dissenting opinion in *Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman* [465 U.S. 89, 126, 167 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting)] that the Court's Eleventh Amendment law "illuminate[s] the character of an institution." I have always wanted to ask you to expound on that analysis. (*Laughter*)

**Justice Stevens:** Well, I have written a great deal on that issue, and I am sure I don't have much to add. I would really recommend that you read a book called *Five Chiefs* [Little, Brown and Company 2011]. It has a lot to say on the issue. (*Laughter*)

**President Ramo:** Yes, sir.

**Professor José F. Anderson (Md.):** Good afternoon, Justice. I was wondering if you have any thoughts on what you think the direction that Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is likely to go in the coming years, or at least a framework for how the Eighth Amendment might be looked at in the coming years in the Supreme Court.

**Justice Stevens:** Well, of course that is a very difficult question, because it depends on the attitudes of who is sitting on the Court at the particular time and the particular issue. I really think that, with regard to the death penalty, which is, I'm sure, at the back of your mind in this question, I am not sure that the democratic process won't

provide the answer sooner than the Court does. Because I do think there is really a significantly growing appreciation of the basic imbalance in a cost-versus-benefit analysis, that the application of the death penalty does a lot of harm, really does very little good over and beyond the imposition of a sentence of life without possibility of parole. And it always includes the continuing risk of an incorrect conclusion by the jury, the death penalty having been rejected in Michigan on the basis of the fact that two men had been executed and later it was established that they were innocent. I think that the likelihood is that the public generally will come to realize that there is a tremendous waste of resources in administering the death penalty, and they will, on a state-by-state basis, reach the conclusion which I think the Constitution would also.

**Professor Anderson:** Thank you, Justice. (*Applause*)

**Ms. Michelle Fields (D.C.):** Can I just get your thoughts on the Supreme Court's impending health-care decision (*laughter*) and whether you think it looks good or bad for the Administration?

**Justice Stevens:** Well, that is really an easy question to answer because I have not read the briefs, (*laughter*) and I really make a very conscious effort not to try to decide difficult issues without hearing both sides of a case.

Thank you. (*Applause*)

**President Ramo:** Justice Stevens, I wanted to tell you that I finished reading *Five Chiefs* last week. I hope that everybody here not only gets the book and reads it, but it is the perfect book for people who are not lawyers. It is the most amazing accessible explanation of the really profound importance of the Court and its decisions in our country, and it includes, which is so important because so many people have never read it, the United States Constitution at the end. So I give it a five-star Amazon review.

**Justice Stevens:** Thank you very much.

**President Ramo:** Ladies and gentlemen and Justice Stevens, what an amazing opportunity for all of us to hear you. Thank you.

**Justice Stevens:** Thank you. (*Applause*)